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The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts
By GEORGE A. STRONG*
THE ILLEGALITY of contracts constitutes a vast, confusing and
rather mysterious area of the law. Even the phrase causes difficulty;
some writers contending that it presents a contradiction in terms.'
And the term "illegal" is often used with varying content. Basically,
however, it may be said that an illegal contract is one that is unenforceable as a matter of policy because enforcement would be injurious to the best interest of the public. It is relatively immaterial
whether the policy forbidding enforcement is declared by the legislature or by the courts. A contract may be illegal because the object
or purpose of the contract is illegal. It may be illegal because it contains an illegal promise, although the performance of the promise is
not itself illegal. Or, it may be illegal because a lawful promise has
been or will be performed in an illegal manner.
The variety of factors which have given rise to problems of illegality seems endless-contract in restraint of trade; 2 purchase by a
corporation of its own shares; 3 lack of a contractor's license; 4 failure
of a conditional sales contract to contain required terms;5 fee splitting
contract with an attorney; 6 failure of an exclusive listing agreement to
contain a termination date;7 exculpatory clauses, and provisions for
liquidated damages."
* B.S. 1944, University of Notre Dame; M.A. 1952, University of California; LL.B.
1955, University of Santa Clara; Assistant Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Uni-

versity of Santa Clara Law School; member of the Calif. and the United States Supreme
Court bars. The writer wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of William A.
Riordan, member, Third Year class, University of Santa Clara Law School, in the preparation of this article.
16 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §

1373 (1951);

RFSTATEMENT, CONTR-ACTS

§ 512 (1932).

The California courts invariably use the phrase "illegal contract." See cases discussed in
text, infra.
2
Haas v. Hodge, 171 Cal. App. 2d 522, 340 P.2d 632 (1959); Anderson Crop
Dusters, Inc. v. Matley, 159 Cal. App. 2d 811, 324 P.2d 710 (1959).
3 Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 46 Cal. 2d 450, 296 P.2d 554 (1956).
4Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
5 City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal. 2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).
6Cain v. Bums, 131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955).
7 Nichols v. Boswell-Alliance Constr. Corp. 181 Cal. App. 2d 584, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546

(1960).
8 For an excellent discussion of liquidated damages and exculpatory clauses see
Smith, Contractual Control of Damages in Commercial Transactions, 12 HASTINGS L.J.
122 (1960).
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Public policy may continue to find compelling reasons for refusing
enforcement of contracts which in the past have not been considered
objectionable but which have become suspect in a changing socioeconomic environment. An example is the contract of adhesion or
the take-it-or-leave-it contract. In a recent case, Mr. Justice Tobriner
defined a contract of adhesion as follows: "The term signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." Courts may refuse
to enforce certain contract terms as it becomes more apparent that
they are the result of superior bargaining power rather than the free
choice of the parties. Naturally, it is understood that the terms decided
upon by the parties are generally the result of their relative bargaining
positions. But here, as a rule, there are acceptable alternatives. Today,
however, because of the concentration of strength, primarily economic
strength, freedom to choose between acceptable alternatives may not
exist.
Perhaps the most vital and practical problem in the area of illegal
contracts is the one of enforceability. One of the reasons for the apparent confusion is the fact that illegality may appear in many forms
and in varying degrees. It may result from the lack of a required
license or from a contract in restraint of trade. Moreover, the court
is confronted with a double problem-the protection of the public
welfare and interest and, if consistent with public policy, granting
relief to the parties. Another source of confusion seems to be the tendency of some courts to speak in terms of absolute rules, and others
in terms of numerous exceptions. Unfortunately, there appear to be
several conflicting and competing "absolute" rules. On the other
hand, a monotonous and patterned recital of exceptions is apt to obscure the actual rule of decision. It is the purpose of this article to
discuss some of the more recent cases dealing with the enforceability
of illegal contracts.
I. Raising the Issue of Illegality

Must Illegality Be Pleaded?
The illegality of a contract is sometimes thought of as an affirmative defense which, if not specially pleaded, is waived. This rule,
fortunately with qualifications, has found expression in several California cases. In Eaton v. Brock, 10 the plaintiffs, a licensed retail milk
9 Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d
(1961).
10 124 Cal. App. 2d 10, 268 P.2d 58 (1954).

,

,

10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784
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distributor and a cooperative entered into a contract whereby the
cooperative undertook to collect and to guarantee payment of all accounts of the retailer's customers who were members of the cooperative, and further agreed to solicit new customers for the retailer. A
controversy arose between the plaintiffs and Brock, the state Director
of Agriculture, who contended that the contract violated the Milk
Control Act, California Agriculture Code sections 4200-4420. The
plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory relief to have the contract
declared valid. This, of course, was not the typical illegality case.
Illegality of the contract, although the principal issue in the case, was
not an issue betNween the contracting parties nor was it an issue in an
action on the contract. Nonetheless, in upholding the trial court's determination that the defendant had the burden of proving the illegality of the contract, the district court of appeal stated that ".... where

the illegality of a contract does not appear from the face of the complaint it becomes a matter of affirmative defense that must be specially
pleaded. And in such case the burden of proof is on the defendant."",
In Cain v. Burns,'2 the plaintiff, an investigator, sought to enforce
a fee splitting contract against an attorney. The plaintiff contended
that inasmuch as the defendant had merely filed a general denial of
the allegations contained in the complaint and had not pleaded illegality as a defense he was barred from later raising it. The court
answered:13
So far as applicable to the circumstances of this case, the authorities
seem clear that although generally illegality of a contract is a defense
which must be pleaded, that rule is qualified as follows: (1) where
the illegality appears on the face of the contract, or (2) where the
evidence which proves the contract discloses the contract's illegality.
Public's Interest in NonEnforcement
It would appear upon the basis of the above stated rules that the
illegality of a contract will not bar recovery on the contract unless
such illegality is specially pleaded or unless the illegality appears on
the face of the complaint or contract, or is disclosed by the contract.
So stated, the rule treats the issue of illegality as one affecting only
the interest of the litigants and disregards the interest that the public
might have in the nonenforcement of an illegal contract. Certainly
the court should not be precluded from considering and weighing the
3. Supra note 10, at 13, 268 P.2d at 60.
12 131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955).

ia Id.at 442, 280 P.2d at 890. The court cites 2 WrrKIN, CALi oRN A PRocEDURE
Pleading § 537, at 1531-1533 (1954). The rule stated by the court would appear to be
what Witkin refers to as the converse of the "supposed" rule. According to Witkin the
basic rule is that illegality may bar recovery although not pleaded.
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interest of the public by a mere rule of pleading. The effect to be
given to an illegal element of a contract should not depend upon who
alleges and proves it nor upon the manner in which it comes to the
attention of the court. Rather, it should depend upon how the court
can best serve the interest of the public and, when not inimical to
the public interest, do justice to the parties. 14 This thinking has found
strong expression in several recent California decisions.
In Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons'5 the plaintiff brought an
action for damages for breach of equipment rental agreements and
for the reasonable rental value of equipment alleged to have been
held beyond the agreed rental period. In its answer the defendant
admitted that the equipment had been furnished under the written
rental agreements, but denied that it had breached the agreements.
It did not plead illegality as a defense. The trial court found however
that the plaintiff in reality had agreed to act and had acted as a
contractor within the meaning of section 7026 of the Business and
Professions Code and, being unlicensed, it was barred by section 7031
from maintaining any action for compensation. On appeal the plaintiff argued that the trial court was precluded from finding that the
rental agreements were actually subcontracts because it should have
restricted its findings to the issues raised by the pleadings. Speaking
for the court, Traynor, J., stated: 16
Whatever the state of the pleadings, when the evidence shows that
the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power
and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummation or encouragement of
what public policy forbids. . . . It is immaterial that the parties,
whether by inadvertence or consent, even at the trial do not raise
the issue. The court may do so of its own motion when the testimony
produces evidence of illegality .... It is not too late to raise the issue
on motion for new trial ... in a proceeding to enforce an arbitration
award . . . or even on appeal.
The plaintiff also contended that the parol evidence rule precluded
the admission of other evidence showing the true nature of the rental
agreements because the agreements stated that they contained all of
the provisions agreed to by the parties. Stating that the plaintiff's
contention was without merit, the court said: 17
The policy in favor of narrowing the issues in dispute, which normally confines the court to those made by the pleadings, and the
6 CoRmiN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1533, at 1049-50.
1548 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
14

16 Id. at 147-48, 308 P.2d at 717.
17 Supra note 15, at 148, 308 P.2d at 718.
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policy of the parol evidence rule favoring the conclusiveness of integrated written agreements, both give way before the importance of
discouraging illegal conduct. To this end, the trial court must be
free to search out illegality lying behind the forms in which the
parties have cast the transaction to conceal such illegality.
The fact that the defendant has pleaded the illegality of one element of the transaction as a defense does not preclude the court from
considering on its own motion another basis of illegality.' 8
Where First Questioned on Appeal
And, although as a general rule, a question may not be raised for
the first time on appeal, an exception is made to the rule when the
plaintiff seeks to enforce an illegal contract.' 9 In Du Pre v. Bogumill,20 the illegal feature of the contract was not pleaded nor did the
defendant raise the issue of illegality at the trial. The case was tried
on the theory that the contract was valid. Illegality of the contract
was raised on appeal and the court said: "A party should not be permitted to completely change his position and adopt a new theory on
appeal where questions other than law are presented. Such would be
unfair to the trial court and the plaintiff." 2 ' It would seem that if the
interest of the public is the paramount consideration when a question
of illegality arises, fairness to the trial court and the other party should
not be determinative of the court's right or duty to ascertain the true
facts so that it many not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummation of what public policy forbids. In the instant case however, the court did consider the issue.
Must Court Consider Issue Not Pleaded?
The above language from the Lewis & Queen case would seem
to establish the salutary rule that a court may pursue the question of
the illegality of a contract whenever and however it comes to its
attention. But must it do so in the absence of pleading? In Dean v.
McNerney22 the defendant's original answer did not plead illegality
as a defense. After certain testimony tending to support such a defense, the defendant asked leave to file an amended answer pleading
the facts shown by the testimony as establishing illegality. The trial
court refused permission to file the amended answer and this refusal
8Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal. 2d 528, 297 P.2d 961 (1956).
City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App. 2d -, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1960).

19

20 173 Cal. App. 2d 406,
21 Id. at 414, 343 P.2d at
2291 Cal. App. 206, 266

343 P.2d 415 (1959).
421.
Pac. 975 (1928).
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was assigned as error upon appeal. It was held that the trial court's
refusal to permit the defendant to file the amended answer did not
result in prejudice because the testimony tending to show the illegality was before the court and if the case presented a question of
illegality it had to be considered by the court whether pleaded or not.
Using language which has been quoted in part in several more recent
cases,2 3 the court stated: "The law is very well settled that, where
the defendant does not set up the defense of illegality, but that the
case made by the plaintiff or the defendant shows illegality, it becomes the duty of the court, sua sponte, to refuse to entertain the
action."24
Perhaps it should be pointed out in passing that the above quoted
language from the Dean case does not distinguish between the court's
duty to consider and pass upon an issue of illegality when it arises
and the ultimate question of the enforceability of an illegal contract.
In Tevis v. Blanchard,25 plaintiff brought an action on a promissory note. The defendant did not plead illegality of the transaction
as a defense; however, his counsel tried the case throughout upon the
theory that the note was void as a part of an illegal transaction and he
requested instructions on that theory. The trial court, however, did
not recognize the existence of the issue of illegality and refused defendant's instructions, submitting that issue to the jury. Quoting the
above passage from the Dean case, the district court of appeal remanded the cause for a new trial and instructed the trial court to
permit the parties to amend their pleadings as they might request.
The illegal aspect of the contract in May v. Herron26 was not
pleaded as a defense and apparently the trial court pursued the issue
on its own motion and denied plaintiff relief solely on the ground of
illegality. In affirming, the district court of appeal stated ". . . that
even though the defendants in their pleadings do not allege the defense of illegality if the evidence shows the facts from which the illegality appears it becomes 'the duty of the court sua sponte to refuse
to entertain the action."' 27 In this case, the trial court did raise the
issue of illegality; consequently, the question of whether or not it
would be required to do so in the absence of pleading was not actually
decided. However, the court used the language of the Dean case
regarding the trial court's duty to consider the issue on its own motion.
23 May v. Herron, 127 Cal. App. 2d 707, 710, 274 P.2d 484, 486, (1954); Tevis v.
Blanchard, 122 Cal. App. 2d 731, 733, 266 P.2d 85, 87 (1954).
24 Dean v. McNerney, supra note 22, at 208, 266 Pac. at 976.
25 122 Cal. App. 2d 731, 266 P.2d 85 (1954).
26 127 Cal. App. 2d 707, 274 P.2d 484.
27 Id. at 710, 274 P.2d at 486.
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In Agran v. Shapiro,28 the plaintiff brought an action to recover the
value of accounting services rendered the defendants. Judgment for
plaintiff was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial because,
although illegality was not pleaded as a defense, the evidence indicated that the plaintiff's services amounted to the illegal practice of
law. The court stated that when the question of illegality develops
during the course of a trial, it must be considered by the court on its
own motion whether pleaded or not.
The scant authority supporting the proposition that the court
must inquire into the issue of illegality whenever it comes to its attention regardless of the state of the pleadings, is buttressed by reason.
Illegality is not merely a matter of private concern to the parties. In
fact, in some situations it may be to the advantage of both parties to
avoid the issue. However, since the public interest, whether declared
by statute or the courts, may require the court to refuse to enforce
the contract because of the illegal element, the court must press an
investigation into the nature and extent of the illegality involved. Of
course, the court may ultimately decide that the illegal aspect of the
transaction does not require denial of all remedy. But this determination should be made after a careful consideration of all the facts in
light of the public interest to be served and not on the basis of when,
how or by whom the issue was initially raised.
Retreat From Lewis & Queen
In a recent case the supreme court retreated somewhat from the
sound position it took in the Lewis & Queen case. In Fomco, Inc., v.
Joe Maggio, Inc.,2 9 the element of illegality was the plaintiff's lack of
a dealer's or cash buyer's license. The lack of the license was not
pleaded, nor did it become evident at the pretrial conference nor
during the trial. The issue was first raised by the defendant on motion
for new trial as newly discovered evidence. The supreme court in its
first opinion,30 subsequently vacated, stated that the claim of illegality
is of a sort which must challenge the attention of the court whenever
and however raised. The court then went on to consider the issue of
illegality and concluded that it was not of such a nature that all remedy
should be denied the plaintiff.
For some reason, not apparent in the opinion, the court granted a
rehearing. In the second opinion the court reversed its prior position.
The court pointed out that the right to a new trial was purely statutory
28 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954).

Cal. -,
358 P.2d 918, 10 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1961). This opinion vacated an
earlier opinion found at 356 P.2d 203, 8 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1960).
30356 P.2d 203, 8 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1960).
2 55
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and that a new trial cannot be granted upon the ground of newly discovered evidence unless the motion therefor is supported by an affidavit reciting facts which show that the evidence could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered at the trial. In the instant
case, the court said that whether the plaintiff had the required license
or not was a matter of public record and could have been discovered
by timely inquiry. The court did not inquire into the nature of the
illegality claimed; it did not consider the policy of the legislature in
requiring the license in question; it did not determine whether the
interest of the public demanded nonenforcement of the contract. As
a matter of fact, apparently the court did not consider the policy of
the legislature in establishing statutory grounds for a new trial. It is
difficult to believe that it was the intention of the legislature to preclude the court from investigating a claim of illegality. It is true, of
course, that the claimed illegality did not involve serious moral turpitude. But what if it had?
The court distinguished the Lewis & Queen case on the ground
that in that case the issue of illegality was first raised during the trial
and not on a motion for a new trial. However, in that case the court
said by way of dictum: "It is immaterial that the parties, whether by
1
inadvertence or consent, even at the trial do not raise the issue."3
II. Reliance Upon the Illegal Feature
It has been stated as general rule that a contract which is against
public policy or against the mandate of a statute may not be made
the foundation of any action, either in law or equity 2 The parties
are left where they are found on the principle that any resulting injustice between them is outweighed by the public interest in deterring
illegal conduct. To this rule many exceptions have been appended.
One such exception is concerned with the extent to which the plaintiff
must rely upon the illegal feature of the transaction to establish a
prima facie case.
Test of Reliance
In C.I.T. Corp. v. Breckenridge,83 the defendants employed one
Sears as a contractor to remodel a building. They negotiated with the
plaintiff for a loan to help finance these improvements. For some
reason, the defendants prepared a note naming Sears the payee who
Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 148, 308 P.2d 713, 717 (1957).
Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 46 Cal. 2d 450, 453-454, 296 P.2d 554,
556 (1956).
33 63 Cal. App. 2d 198, 146 P.2d 271 (1944).
31

32
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in turn endorsed the note to the plaintiff when the funds were received.
Upon defendants' default the plaintiff brought this action for the
unpaid balance. Sears was not a licensed contractor, and the defendants contended that inasmuch as Sears could not have recovered compensation for his services from the defendants, the plaintiff could not
recover on the note because the funds were used to pay the unlicensed
contractor for the performance of his contract. In reply, the court
quoted34 from the opinion in Berka v. Woodward:35
The test... whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction
is capable of being enforced at law, is whether the plaintiff requires
the aid of the illegal transaction to establish his case. If the plaintiff
cannot open his case without showing that he has broken the law,
the court will not assist him, whatever his claim in justice may be
upon the defendant.
The Converse Rule
The above rule is expressed in its negative form, i.e., the court will
not grant relief to a plaintiff who must rely upon the illegal aspect of
the transaction to make out his case. However, in the C.I.T. Corp.
case, the court actually applied the converse of the rule. The court
pointed out that in the instant case the plaintiff could establish its
case by proving the due execution of the note, its endorsement by
Sears, and the amount of the unpaid balance. Since no proof of the
illegal transaction was necessary, the court affirmed judgment for the
plaintiff. As applied, the rule states that the court may grant the plaintiff relief if he can establish his case without relying upon the illegal
feature30 The rule thus formulated came under attack in the case of
Wells v. Comstock.7
In the Wells case, the plaintiffs, officers of a corporation, promised
to sell and Comstock, the general manager, promised to buy a certain
number of shares of stock in the corporation. The shares were issued
in violation of the permit of the Commissioner of Corporations. 8 Coinstock refused to pay the balance owed under the contract and defended the suit for breach upon the ground that the contract was
unenforceable because the shares had been issued illegally. However,
Id. at 200, 146 P.2d at 272.
35 125 Cal. 119, 127, 57 Pac. 777, 779 (1899).
36 Corbin would state the rule as follows: ". . . [A]fter all the factors in the case
including the illegal ones are known to the court it should hold a party's claim enforceable only if (1) the lawful ones standing alone are sufficient to sustain the claim and
(2) the unlawful ones are not such as to cause enforcement to be against the public
interest or unjust to the other party." 6 CoRniN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1533, at 1048.
3746 Cal. 2d 528, 297 P.2d 961 (1956).
38 See CAL. CoRt. CoDE §§ 26100, 26104.
34
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the plaintiffs did not rely in any way upon this aspect of the transaction. They alleged and the defendant admitted the execution of
the contract and Comstock's refusal to pay the balance owed. The
illegality first appeared from testimony of witnesses called by the defendants. The plaintiffs relied upon the above quoted language from
the C.I.T. Corp. case and section 597 of the Restatement of Contracts
which states: "A bargain collaterally and remotely connected with an
illegal purpose or act is not rendered illegal thereby if proof of the
bargain can be made without relying upon the transaction." In reply,
the supreme court said that the quoted "test" cannot be understood
to mean that if the plaintiff can open his case without showing the
illegal feature, the court will assist him even though it may subse9
quently appear that he is relying upon an illegal transaction.
In other words, the converse of the quoted test is not a correct
statement of the law and, as to section 597 of the Restatement, the
court held that comment "b" to that section was more applicable to
the facts of the case. Comment "b" states: "Even though a plaintiff's
case can be made out without indicating anything unlawful, it may be
shown that the bargain is illegal because of facts not brought out in
the plaintiff's case, provided that the facts so offered show a close
enough connection with an illegal transaction." In the Wells case the
court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff, pointing out that at the
time the shares were issued, it was known by all of the parties that
the issuance violated the permit and that it was their intent subsequently to sell the shares to Comstock. The illegal aspect of the transaction was intimately connected with the sale.
It seems evident that the enforceability of an illegal contract or
a contract associated with an illegal act or transaction should not depend upon the plaintiff's skill in avoiding the illegal element in his
pleadings and proof. Frequently, a plaintiff can make out a good case
without divulging its illegal features. For example, in the Lewis &
Queen case,4 0 the action was brought on an equipment rental agreement and it was not until the court inquired into the relationship
between the parties and the nature of the work that had been done,
that it became apparent the plaintiff had acted as a subcontractor
without a license. Normally, the ultimate purpose or object of a contract need not be pleaded. Consequently, by not revealing an illegal
purpose, the plaintiff can make out a good cause of action. In May
v. Herron,41 the illegal factor involved was the defendant's fraudulent
procurement of a veteran's priority for the construction of a residence
39 Wells v. Comstock, supra note 37, at 532-33, 297 P.2d at 963-64.
40 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
41

127 Cal. App. 2d 707, 274 P.2d 484 (1954).
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when it was not his intention to reside in the home. On the other
hand, it does not follow that a plaintiff must be denied all relief because his case reveals an illegal factor. And this is true although he
may be the wrongdoer. In Nichols v. Boswell-Alliance Construction
Corp.,42 the plaintiff was permitted to recover commissions for selling

houses under an exclusive listing agreement although it violated section 10176 of the Business and Professions Code in that it failed to
specify a termination date which was obvious on its face.
In none of the last three mentioned cases did the court consider
the test of the C.I.T. Corp. case. Had the test been applied, the results
would have undoubtedly been different. The court correctly applied
the more cogent tests of the nature of the illegality, the public interest,
the fault of the parties and the merits between the parties.
Degree of Relationship Between Contract and Illegal Factor
If the plaintiff can make out a good case without relying upon an
illegal act or transaction, it is probably because the act or transaction
is only collaterally and remotely related to the cause of action. The
closeness of the relationship between the contract and the illegal factor
is an important consideration in the determination of the ultimate
enforceability of the contract. The closer the relationship, the more
tainted the contract becomes and the stronger the argument for nonenforcement. However, if the factor is collateral and remote, it may
be considered insignificant and immaterial. On the other hand, if the
factor presents a serious question of illegality, it may taint the contract although otherwise it might be considered merely collateral. This
thinking could have been applied in Lee On v. Lang43 and Brenner
v. Haley,44 as apparently it was in Leonard v. Hermreck,45 with the
same results achieved. However, the court there relied upon the rule
in the C.I.T. Corp. case.
In the Lee On case the plaintiff brought an action against the
sheriff and the district attorney to recover money seized while in use
in gambling games. The court held that the test to be applied was
whether the plaintiff could establish his case otherwise than through
the medium of an illegal transaction to which he was a party.46 The
court went on to say that plaintiff could not prove his right to possession of the money without disclosing that it was the subject of illegal
gambling activities. One could disagree with this last conclusion of
181 Cal. App. 2d 584, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1960).
4337 Cal. 2d 499, 234 P. 2d 9 (1951).
44185 Cal. App. 2d -,
8 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1960).
45 168 Cal. App. 2d 142, 335 P.2d 515 (1959).
46 Supra note 43, at 502, 234 P.2d at 11.
42
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the court and Mr. Justice Carter did so in a dissenting opinion. But,
assuming that the plaintiff could establish his ownership of the money
and that it was taken by the sheriff who still retained it without the
necessity of showing the nature of its use, recovery could still be
denied because of the closeness of the illegal factor and the seriousness of the illegality involved. Two recent cases furnish a good contrast to the Lee On case.
In the Leonard case the defendants, who were awarded a contract
to construct a section of a state highway, entered into a contract with
the plaintiff who agreed to furnish a loader and to haul dirt to the
road bed. The plaintiff did not have a contractor's license. He ceased
work before the contract was completely performed and commenced
an action against the defendants based upon two causes of action.
The first was a common count for the value of services rendered the
defendants and the second was for damages for the defendants' wrongful detention and use of plaintiff's loader. The court held that the
plaintiff could not recover compensation for his services as a contractor
by virtue of section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code but that
he could recover, if ultimately proved, for the defendants' conversion of
his property. The defendants contended that the transaction to which
the second cause of action pertained was tainted with illegality because it arose from an illegal relationship. The court did not agree.
It pointed out that the fact that there had been a relationship founded
upon an illegal contract did not give the defendants the right to appropriate the plaintiff's property to their own use after the relationship
had come to an end. This is sound because the acts which were alleged to amount to conversion were collateral to the contract, and the
illegality involved, the lack of a contractor's license, was not serious.
In the Brenner case, the plaintiff had possession of a fence based
upon a lease. He used the fence for advertising purposes. The defendant, claiming permission of the owners to do so, on several occasions painted over signs that the plaintiff had placed on the fence.
The defendant defended the action against him for trespass on the
ground that the plaintiff's lease was illegal because it violated a zoning
ordinance. Here again, the court relied upon the rule that whether
a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of being
enforced depends on whether the plaintiff requires the aid of an illegal transaction to establish his case. 48 The court then went on to
say that the legality of the plaintiff's lease was not important because
he was entitled to maintain the action merely upon his possession of
47 Id. at 507-08, 234 P.2d at 12 (dissent).
48

Supra note 44, at 222, 8 Cal. Rptr. 227.
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the fence. The issue of title, and hence the legality of the lease, was
collateral to the issue of the invasion of his possessory rights.
It is regrettable that the court saw fit in the Brenner case to use
the so-called "reliance" test after its validity and usefulness had been
challenged in the Wells case. At best it is a superficial approach to
the problem of the enforceability of illegal contracts where supposedly
the public interest is involved.

I. The Effect of a Statutory Penalty
Expressio unis exclusio alterius. This rule has found its way into
several recent California opinions and presents a rather interesting
commentary on the development of decisional law.
In City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey49 the underlying facts
are as follows: the defendant purchased a new Lincoln on a conditional sale contract from the plaintiff company, trading in as the down
payment his 1948 Packard which left a balance of 4,232.38 dollars.
At the time the defendant signed the sales order the time price differential and the contract balance were not filled in as required by
subdivision (a) of section 2982 of the Civil Code. After making two
installment payments the defendant returned the automobile to the
seller who in turn resold it and brought an action against the defendant for the deficiency. The defendant answered and filed a crosscomplaint contending that the contract was illegal and unenforceable
and that he was entitled to recover the consideration that he had paid.
Subdivision (e) of section 2982 provides that in the event of a violation of subdivisions (c) or (d), the buyer may recover from the
seller in a civil action the "total amount paid" on the contract balance. However, in the instant case only subdivision (a) was allegedly
violated.
The code makes no provision whatsoever governing the effect of
violations of subdivision (a). It could be inferred that inasmuch as
the legislature provided a penalty for violations of subdivisions (c)
and (d) and none for (a), that it was the intention of the legislature
that there be none. The court, however, inferred that for a failure
to comply with subdivision (a) the buyer could recover the consideration that he had given. The result, then, is this: for a violation of
(c) and (d) the expressed statutory penalty is that the buyer may
recover the "total amount paid" and for a violation of (a) the inferred
penalty is that the buyer may recover the "consideration that he has
given."
,9 52 Cal. 2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

Exclusiveness of Statutory Penalty
It will be noted that the difference between the two penalties
discussed in City Lincoln-Mercury Co. is that one provides for "total"
recovery and the other simply for recovery. This intriguing difference
became of utmost importance in one branch of the case. The plaintiff asked for a setoff against the defendant's recovery of his installment
payments and the value of the Packard. The claim for setoff was
based upon the depreciated value of the Lincoln caused by the defendant's use of the car. In resolving the question of whether the
plaintiff should be permitted the setoff the court relied upon the rule
that "the courts will not impose penalties for noncompliance with
statutory provisions in addition to those that are provided expressly
or by necessary implication."5° Applying this rule to the statute as
interpreted, the court concluded that to deny the plaintiff a right of
setoff would amount to an increase in the penalty intended by the
legislature for a violation of subdivision (a). The court pointed out
that inasmuch as the buyer could recover the total amount paid for
a violation of subdivisions (c) or (d), it must have been the intent
of the legislature to deny a right of setoff in cases involving violations
of those subdivisions. The court held that the statute implied a penalty for violations of (a) which differed from the express penalty for
violations of (c) and (d) and then went on to hold that a denial of
setoff would increase the implied penalty which the above rule forbids.
In stating the rule that the courts will not impose penalties for
noncompliance with statutory provisions in addition to those that are
provided expressly or by necessary implication, the court cited as
authority the cases of Grant v. Weatherholtsl and Comet Theatre
Enterprisesv. Cartwright.52 The Grant case, which involved the violation of a licensing requirement, in turn cites the Comet Theatre
Enterprises case, which also was concerned with a licensing statute
and which cites no authority. Neither case discusses the rule beyond
its mere statement. However, an earlier federal court case, Macco
53
Constr. Co. v. Farr,stated the rule as follows:
A considerable number of recent cases have held that where the
violation of a licensing statute is merely malum prohibitum and does
not endanger the public health or morals and where penalties for
noncompliance are specifically set forth and no declaration that a
contract in relation thereto is void or its enforcement prohibited,
50 Id. at 276, 339 P.2d at 858.
51 123 Cal. App. 2d 34, 266 P.2d 185 (1954).
52 195 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1952).
53

137 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1943).
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such additional punishment should not be imposed unless the legislative intent is expressed or appears by clear implication.
It will be noted, of course, that the rule in the Macco case is
stated with significant qualifications which do not accompany its
statement in the Grant and City Lincoln-Mercury cases. As a matter
of fact, the rule purports to deal only with those situations wherein
penalties are "specifically set forth" for the violation of a statute.
Penalty Statutes Silent on Enforceability
The rule of the Macco case points up the question as to whether
a contract is invalid which is entered into in violation of a statute
which imposes a penalty for such violation, but does not specifically
provide that the contract shall be void. As a general rule, a contract
in violation of a criminal statute is void although the statute does not
declare it so.r In Bartlett v. Vinor, Lord Holt, Ch. J., stated: 5
...[Elvery contract made for or about any matter or thing which is
prohibited and made unlawful by any statute, is a void contract,
tho' the statute itself doth not mention that it shall be so, but only
inflicts a penalty implies a prohibition, tho' there are no prohibitory
words in the statute.
To this general rule of nonenforcement of a contract in violation
of a statute imposing a penalty, exceptions have been made upon a
basis of an inferred legislative intent. In fact, the thinking has pushed
to the point of establishing the rule under consideration. In Lewis &
Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, the court said by way of dictum: "In some
cases, on the other hand, the statute making the conduct illegal, in
providing for a fine or administrative discipline excludes by implication the additional penalty involved in holding the illegal contract
unenforceable .... ,,-6
Less than three weeks prior to the decision in the Lewis & Queen
57
case, the court stated:
The general rule controlling in cases of this character is that where
a statute prohibits or attaches a penalty to the doing of an act, the
act is void, and this, notwithstanding that the statute does not expressly pronounce it so, and it is immaterial whether the thing
forbidden is malum in se or merely malum prohibitum. . . . The
54

See Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 482 (1957).
55 Carth. 251, 252, 90 Eng. Rep. 750, 750 (K.B. 1693).
5848 Cal. 2d 141, 151, 308 P.2d 713, 719 (1957). This language is quoted in Nichols v. Boswell-Alliance Constr. Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 584, 587, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546,
548 (1960).

5 Contractor's Safety Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71, 76,
307 P.2d 626, 629 (1957), quoting Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal. 2d 561,
568, 177 P.2d 4, 8 (1947).
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imposition by statute of a penalty implies a prohibition of the act
to which the penalty is attached, and a contract founded upon such
act is void.
It is not the purpose of this article to choose between the merits
of these apparently conflicting rules. It is enough to point out that
there may be a new reason for uncertainty in an already very confused
area of the law. And perhaps what is most regrettable is the fact that
in the City Lincoln-Mercury case the court pointed out that it could
have, and indeed had in prior cases, reached the same results without
the elaborate analysis of the statutory language and without establishing the rule of the case.
IV. Relative Fault
Seldom does a California court refer to the general rule that no
relief in law or in equity will be granted to one who is a party to an
illegal contract, 58 without acknowledging that in many circumstances
the interests of the public, for whose protection the rule exists, can
be adequately safeguarded while extending some form of relief to
the party who is blameless or relatively less at fault.
Reference is sometimes made to a significantly qualified version
of the general rule: "The principle that participants to an illegal contract who are in pari delicto can secure no relief based on such contract, is an ancient and most salutary one. It is part of the general
rule that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands."50
(Emphasis added.) And quite often disparity of fault between the
parties is treated as the basis for an exception to the rule of no relief:60
"However, to these settled rules there are certain recognized exceptions in favor of a party who is not in par delicto with the other party
to the contract, and who as the more innocent of the two, seeks recovery. "6 0 (Emphasis added.)
Whether a disparity of relative fault is regarded as a qualification
or as an exception to the rule, it should be borne in mind that any
consideration of the relative merits between the parties should ultimately depend upon the extent of protection required in each case
for the public interest. Stated otherwise, public policy must be the
final measure of available relief in each case.6 1
58 Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 46 Cal. 2d 450, 453, 296 P.2d 554, 556

(1956).
59 Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 283, 209 P.2d 24, 28 (1949).
60 Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., supra note 58, at 454, 296 P.2d at 556.
61 "By 'public policy' is intended that principle of law which holds that no citizen
can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the
public good ..
." Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Ass'n 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d
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When Are Parties in Pari Delicto?
When are the parties said to be in pari delicto? Simply translated,
the phrase means "in equal fault." Since the comparison is based upon
the degree of legal guilt ascribed to each party, it presupposes the
determination of prior legal issues. And when they have been determined, the court, as Corbin observes, ". . . has reached its decision
by a process that is certainly not a mere deduction from the Latin
maxim."62 No constant answer can be given to the question of when
parties are in pan delicto. The answer will depend upon the circumstances in each case. It will also depend upon whether the public
interest has been weighed in with the balance of fault between the
parties or whether it is weighed separately against the balance of
relative fault, in determining what relief will be given in each case
where the parties are, or are not, in pari delicto.
Since the legislature is considered the primary policy-making body,
statutes expressly forbidding relief in certain cases of illegality seem
to be determinative.63
In Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons,04 the supreme court denied
an award of damages to a subcontractor who, in violation of the Business and Professions Code,6 5 had failed to obtain a license. The Code
provides that noncompliance with the licensing requirement precludes
a recovery of compensation for work done in the capacity of a contractor. It was held that the court would not resort to equitable considerations in defiance of the statute. 66
721, 726 (1953), quoting Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App. 47, 50-51, 264 Pac.
529, 530 (1928).
62 6 CoRB N, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1534, at 1058.
3
6 1n Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954), where
an accountant was not allowed recovery for services which constituted the practice of
law, made a misdemeanor under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 6125, the court held that a
contract, express or implied, the performance of which necessarily involves a violation of
a penal statute, may not give rise to a cause of action.
64 48 Cal. 2d. 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957). See Albaugh v. Moss Constr. Co., 125
Cal. App. 2d 126, 269 P.2d 936 (1954), where the court held that neither language in
a contract under which compensation is being sought, nor any presumption or implication arising therefrom will serve as a substitute for the allegation that the plaintiff has
obtained a license as required by CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031.
65 "No person in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring
or maintain any action in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for
the performance of any act or contract for which a license is required by this chapter,
without alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all times during
the performance of such act or contract." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031.
68
In Marshall v. Von Zumwalt, 120 Cal. App. 2d 807, 862 P.2d 363 (1953), defendant who constructed plaintiff's home without a license was allowed to set up sums
credited to plaintiff on the construction work, as a defense to the latter's action to recover
for a loan and services rendered to defendant. The court stated that CAL. Bus. & PRoF.
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Where the contract is violative of express or implied legislative
policy, but the statute contains no provision denying relief to the
parties, that policy is usually weighed in with the balance of fault or
even made the sole measure of pari delicto. In the Lewis & Queen
67
case the court said:
It is true that when the legislature enacts a statute forbidding certain conduct for the purpose of protecting one class of persons from
the activities of another, a member of the protected class may maintain an action notwithstanding the fact that he has shared in the
illegal transaction. The protective purpose of the legislation is realized by allowing the plaintiff to maintain his action against a defendant within the class primarily to be deterred. In this situation
it is said that the plaintiff is not in pari delicto.
This rule has been applied in several cases involving contracts which
are considered illegal because one of the parties does not have a required license.
There appears interesting dictum in the Lewis & Queen case to
the effect that the class protected by a licensing statute includes anyone who deals with a person required to have such a license.6 s
In Marshall v. La Boi,69 a contractor brought an action for breach
of contract and to foreclose a mechanics lien. The defendant, a nonveteran, used his nephew, a veteran, as a subterfuge to obtain a permit
to construct a residence pursuant to wartime housing regulations designed to protect veterans. 70 In joining with the defendant in applying for the permit, the contractor was unaware of the fraudulent
scheme. Defendant wrongdoer refused to pay the balance due under
the contract and set up the illegality of the contract under the regulations contending that the contractor could not recover since he was
not a member of the class (veterans) protected under the statute.
Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
CODE § 7031 merely prohibited a contractor from bringing an action upon a contract

which he has entered into pertaining to the contracting business, without alleging and
proving that he was duly licensed. It was held that the section did not prohibit him
when sued from setting up as a defense any sums which may be equitably due him from
the plaintiff upon such illegal contract.
67 48 Cal. 2d 141, 153, 308 P.2d 713, 720 (1957).
See also Williams v. Caruso
Enterprises, 140 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 973, 978, 295 P.2d 592, 596 (1956). Compare the
language used in Fischer v. Otsby, 127 Cal. App. 2d 528, 532, 274 P.2d 221, 223 (1954):
"A court will protect the right of a party not in pari delicto with his adversary ... and
this is especially true where the parties occupy a position of confidence and the one
against whom relief is sought induced the action of the other .. "
68Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, supra note 67, at 153, 308 P.2d at 721,
(dictum).
69 125 Cal. App. 2d 253, 270 P.2d 99 (1954).
70 War Powers Act of 1942, as amended, ch. 199, 56 Stat. 176 (1942), and Veteran's Emergency Housing Act of 1946, as amended, ch. 268, Stat. 207 (1946).
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damages for breach of the contract. Affirmative relief was granted
although the plaintiff was not in the class protected by the statute.
A denial of relief would have resulted in unjust enrichment of the
defendant.
Following the approach that the party seeking relief need not be
in the class protected, the case of Cain v. Burns7 placed greater emphasis on whom the prohibition of the statute is directed against, as
the determining factor of pari delicto. Thus an investigator was permitted to recover on an illegal contract entered into with an attorney
to split the attorney's fees derived from certain cases. The court stated
that the statute prohibiting fee splitting prohibits only the attorney,
not the layman and that the punishment for doing so is directed at
attorneys only. The court held that ".... whenever the statute im-

upon the other, they are
poses a penalty upon one party and7 none
2
not to be regarded as par delictum."

In contrast is the case of Holt v. Morgan,73 which applied the
purpose and policy of the statute involved as the measure of relief
available rather than of the issue of pari delicto.
Plaintiff brought an action to quiet title to his interest in a liquor
license pledged to him as security for a loan. A statute 74 made the
transfer for this purpose illegal, and both parties were required to
verify a statement that the transfer was not made in violation of the
statute. This requirement was absent in the case of Cain v. Burns, but
further reasoning in the Holt case would seem applicable to both. The
court pointed out that quite frequently it is the individual who does
not fall within the prohibition of that statute who is interested in enforcing the contract. To permit enforcement by the plaintiff merely
because the statute is not aimed at him would make the statute wholly
ineffective. Consequently, it was held that since the policy of the
statute is to prohibit all use of liquor licenses as security, any such
use is unlawful and void, regardless of whether the parties were in
pari delicto. The court held further that no illegal contract can be
enforced as a matter of protection for the public interest. Pari delicto
will be resorted to only as a test of the right of a party whose fault is
less to recover the consideration he has given.
May v. Herron75 involved facts substantially similar to the Marshall v. La Boi situation under federal wartime housing legislation.
131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955).
at 443, 280 P.2d at 890, citing with approval Irwin v. Curie, 171 N.Y., 409,
413-14, 64 N.E. 161, 162 (1902).
7' 128 Cal. App. 2d 113, 274 P.2d 915 (1954).
74 CAL. Bus. & PaOF. CoDE § 24076.
75 127 Cal. App. 2d 707, 274 P.2d 484 (1954).
7'

721d.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

In the May case however, the party against whom the prohibition was
not directed, actually instigated the illegal scheme in violation of the
statute. The court said the fact that only one of the parties to a contract is amenable to a penal statute does not prevent the other from
being in pari delicto concerning the fraud and deceit involved. Neither of the parties who understood the purpose, nature and probable
result of the agreement entered into could escape his share of liability.
The measure of public policy was applied in this manner by the
7 6
court in the earlier case of Severance v. Knight-Counihan.
It was
held that an executory contract between an employer and his employee
giving the employee an option for the purchase of the employer's property in fraud of rights of the latter's creditors will not be enforced
merely because the employee was less at fault than the employer. It
was held however, that if the parties are not in pari delicto, the party
who is only slightly at fault can recover money paid under an executory
contract. Moreover, even if the party is equally at fault, such relief
may be given if he repudiates the contract before the illegal part of
the bargain is executed.
The approach in these cases is to first determine what, if any, relief can be afforded to the parties without endangernig the public interest. Then, according to a separate balancing of the relative fault
between the parties, the appropriate remaining remedy, if any, is
chosen in each case.
By separating the interests of the public and the interests of the
parties and applying them in this order as measures of available relief,
it appear more probable that adequate consideration will be given to
both interests in each case.
Private Rights vs. Public's Interests
Where, as in the case of express or implied statutory policy, the
consideration of the public interest becomes raveled in the determination of whether the parties are in pari delicto, a court is liable to determine that issue without any consideration of the merits between
the parties. Yet this result should obtain only when the granting of
any relief whatever between the parties would be inimical to the public interest. Obviously, they are not irreconcilable in every case. The
desire of the courts to give the greatest deference to legislative policy
may at times result in over-protection of that policy at the expense of
a remedy between the parties which would not in fact result in a
conflict.
Fortunately, a growing awareness of this balance seems to be developing in many recent California decisions. Varying remedies are
6 29 Cal. 2d 561, 177 P.2d 4, 172 A.L.R. 1107 (1947).
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being made available for varying degrees of fault, depending ultimately however, on the extent of protection necessary in each case
for the public interest.
By considering the matter of public policy apart from, rather than
as determinative of, the issue of relative fault, the Holt and Severance
cases avoid the inconsistencies arising in the statutory cases which
make pari delicto turn on whether a party is a member of a protected
class or one against whom the statutory prohibition is directed. Both,
however, presumed that public policy restricts, in all cases, the recovery of a party not in pari delicto, to the return of consideration
given. Any relief which required enforcement of the illegal bargain,
it was felt, could not be countenanced.
Relief to Parties in Pari Delicto
There are cases, however, in which the courts have enforced to
some extent at least, illegal bargains in granting relief to parties who
are in pari delicto as well as between those who are not. There are,
indeed, instances where such relief has been accorded to the party
who is more responsible for the illegal feature of the transaction.
These are the so-called "accounting of proceeds" cases, where relief is sought between parties upon an agreement which is incidental
to a contractual relation between one or both of them with certain
third parties.
In the case of Norwood v. Iudd 77 plaintiff brought an action

against his partner in the contracting business for dissolution of the
partnership and for an accounting. The trial court had taken notice
on its own motion that no license had been secured for the partnership
as required, and thereupon determined that the plaintiff was entitled
to no equitable relief since both parties had illegally engaged in the
contracting business. On appeal Mr. Justice Peters acknowledged the
rule that participants to an illegal contract who are in pari delicto can
secure no relief based upon the contract because the court will not
lend its aid to the enforcement of an illegal agreement. The rule, it
was said, is a most salutary one insofar as it protects the public and
the courts from imposition, but Mr. Justice Peters, distinguishing the
present type of illegal agreement from engaging in a business which
s
is itself illegal, cautioned:',
But the courts should not be so enamored with the Latin phrase "in
par! delicto" that they blindly extend the rule to every case where
illegality appears somewhere in the transaction. The fundamental
7793

78

Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949).

Id. at 289, 209 P.2d at 31.
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purpose of the rule must always be kept in mind, and the realities
of the situation must be considered. Where, by applying the rule,
the public cannot be protected because the transaction has been completed, where no previous moral turpitude is involved, where the
defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault, and where to
apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly enriched
at the expense of the plaintiff, the rule should not be applied.
The court felt that the exception was proper in this case, and reversed the decision of the trial court which had denied plaintiff's action
for dissolution and an accounting.
Norwood v. Judd distinguished the instant action from those hicensing cases where the firm or person required to be licensed fails
to secure a license and directly sues a third person for services rendered or materials furnished. In such cases, it was said that the unlicensed firm or person cannot recover because to do so would be to
defeat the very purpose of the licensing statute. In this perspective,
whether a party is a member of the class to be protected is a factor in
determining the extent to which the public interest must be protected.79
Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons"0 involved an action by a subcontractor against the principal contractor for breach of rental agreements to furnish construction equipment. The unlicensed plaintiff was
denied any relief primarily on the basis of the licensing statute,6"
which expressly provides that noncompliance is a bar to any action
for the recovery of compensation. The court went on, however, to
distinguish the facts from Norwood v. Judd and limit the holding in
that case strictly to suits for an accounting against a partner or joint
venturer.
Although the court appears to cast some doubt upon

...

whether

the indirect encouragement of an illegal enterprise resulting from the
allowance of such an action [for the accounting of proceeds] is sufficient to outweigh the evil of unjust enrichment," 2 the principle that
the public interest should be the final measure of available relief is
not questioned.
The test in Norwood v. Judd has been applied in somewhat analogous situations, by recent decisions. For instance, in Nichols v.
Boswell-Alliance Constr. Co.,8 3 a broker was allowed to recover com79 Thus, in the case of Fenolio v. McDonald, 171 Cal. App. 2d 508, 340 P.2d 657
(1959), the court, in granting enforcement, extended the rule of Norwood v. Judd, supra
note 77, where the parties were neither partners nor joint venturers, emphasizing that in
this case, defendants were not in the class intended to be protected by the statute.

80

48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031, text quoted supra note 65.

81 CAL.
82

Supra note 80, at 152, 308 P.2d at 720.

83 181 Cal. App. 2d 584, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1960).
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missions earned under a listing agreement with defendant real estate
developer despite his failure to include certain required information in
the agreement. The litigants were not partners or joint venturers. The
statute provided that plaintiff's license could be temporarily suspended
or permanently revoked for noncompliance.8 4 The court, to some degree at least, enforced the illegal contract on behalf of a party in pari
delicto, or perhaps the one most responsible as far as the illegal aspect
of the contract was concerned. The enforcement was limited to the
recovery of commissions earned under the executed aspects of the
contract. Plaintiff was not permitted to recover commissions he had
been prevented from earning, since the executory aspects of the contract would not be enforced.
In resolving the issue of relative fault the court followed the application by Wilson v. Stearns of the ". . . well reasoned and considered

opinion.. ."85 of Norwood v. Judd to a similar factual situation. It
was held that since the third party purchaser, for whose protection
the statute was enacted, had satisfactorily completed his transaction,
protection of the public was no longer a consideration. The court
applied, with emphasis added, what it6 referred to as the "unjust en8
richment" rule of the Norwood case.
In view of the recurrence of the above quoted portion of the
opinion from the Norwood case in several later opinions, it appears
that it is emerging as a rule of exception to the pari delicto principle8 7
But it is uncertain whether the court in the Nichols case was
loosely referring to the rule as one of "unjust enrichment," as a composite of the other factors in the Norwood exception, (viz., no serious
moral turpitude involved, defendant guilty of the greatest moral fault,
and a completed transaction from which the public could no longer
be protected) or whether unjust enrichment was a separate factor,
cumulatively applied with the other factors in determining what, if
any, relief would be available.
If unjust enrichment is regarded as a separate factor, May v. Herron8 8 would be pertinent. In this case it was held in part that recovery
was properly denied parties who were in pari delicto even though one
party would thereby reap an undeserved windfall. Whether an undeserved windfall, without more, would be considered as "unjust en84 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176(f).

Cal. App. 2d 472, 481-482, 267 P.2d 59, 66 (1954).
Ibid., quoting from Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 288, 209 P.2d 24,
31 (1949).
87
Epstein v. Stahl, 176 Cal. App. 2d 53, 1 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1959); Fenolio v.
McDonald, 171 Cal. App. 2d 508, 340 P.2d 657 (1959); Cain v. Bums, 131 Cal. App. 2d
439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955).
88 127 Cal. App. 2d 707, 274 P.2d 484 (1954).
85 123
88
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richment" within the Norwood test, might depend on the degree to
which the other factors, such as defendant's greater moral guilt, were
implicit in the term as it is used there.
The opinion in Nichols added that in each case how the aims of
policy can best be achieved depends on the kind of illegality and the
particularfacts involved.8 9 To this extent, it overruled the view that
".... a statute prohibiting the making of a contract except in a certain
manner ipso facto makes it void if made in any other way."9 0
justifiable Ignorance of Illegality
Moreover, when one party is considered to be justifiably ignorant
of facts which make the contract illegal, and the other party is not,
the decisions09 1 have followed the Restatement view 92 that the illegality
does not preclude enforcement of the contract to some degree. Recovery will be allowed the innocent party for losses incurred or gains
prevented by the other's nonperformance. This would seem to be
another modification of the rule that no illegal contract or right arising
out of an illegal transaction can be enforced by the court whether the
parties are in pari delicto or not.9 3 If one party is justifiably ignorant
or completely innocent, it seems it could be said that he is not in pari
delicto. However, the traditional concept of one who is not in pari
delicto refers to one whose fault is slight in comparison with the fault
of the other party to the transaction.9 4 Both parties are blameworthy,
but to an unequal extent. Where this notion is accepted, justifiable
ignorance is necessarily treated as a distinct concept.
In Marshall v. La Boi,95 the court approved the findings that plaintiff was not in pari delicto with defendants, who were grievously at
fault while plaintiff was only slightly at fault, if at all. The defendant
contended that even though the plaintiff was not in pari delicto he
was not entitled to affirmative relief. The court upheld the findings
89 Nichols v. Boswell-Alliance Constr. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 584, 587, 5 Cal. Rptr.
546, 548 (1960).
90 Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262, 191 Pac. 14, 15 (1920); Dale v. Palmer, 106
Cal. App. 2d 663, 667, 235 P.2d 650, 652 (1951).
91 In Holland v. Morgan & Peacock Properties Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 206, 210, 335
P.2d 769, 772 (1959), the court held that in such circumstances the illegality does not
bar recovery by the innocent party of compensation for performance rendered while he
remains justifiably ignorant of the facts establishing the illegality. See also Dias v. Houston, 154 Cal. App. 2d 279, 281-82, 315 P.2d 885, 886-87 (1957). See also 12 CAL. JusR.
(SECOND) Contracts § 104, at 304 (1953), collecting cases.
92 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 599, at 1111 (1932).
93 Severance v. Knight-Counihan, 29 Cal. 2d 561, 569, 177 P.2d 4, 8-9 (1947);
Holt v. Morgan, 128 Cal. App. 2d 113, 116, 274 P.2d 915, 917 (1954).
94 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 604, at 1120 (1932).
95 125 Cal. App. 2d 253, 270 P.2d 99 (1954).
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of the trial court that the plaintiff was ignorant of the facts underlying
the illegality and concluded that affirmative relief could be granted
upon that ground.
Other cases have treated justifiable ignorance as a degree of disparity of fault. Where one party is justifiably ignorant of facts of which
the other is not, the ignorant party is not in pan delicto. For example,
in Owens v. Haslett,9 6 appellant refused to make payment due at an
agreed stage of the construction of a house. The refusal was based
upon the alleged faulty performance by the contractor. Appellant
thereafter was required to pay a higher sum to another contractor
hired to complete the house. Motion for nonsuit was sustained against
the original contractor who sought to recover for his performance since
he had failed to obtain a license required by a statute which precluded
one who had not complied from recovering any compensation." Appellant cross-complained for damages arising from the contractor's
alleged defective performance. Appeal was taken from denial of the
cross-complaint. Following what was termed the Restatement's "exception" to the rule of no enforcement where parties were in pad
delicto, the court held that if appellant was justifiably ignorant of the
fact which made the contract illegal, that is, contractor's lack of a
license, then she could, on proper pleading and proof, have made her
8
case come within the exception.
If she was not in pan delicto, and if the disparity of fault was such
that she was justifiably ignorant of the facts which made the contract
illegal and the other party was not equally unaware of such facts, the
illegality would not have prevented her recovery of losses incurred or
gain prevented by the other's nonperformance. It was noted, however,
that while illegality of the contract would not preclude recovery in
such a case, any other ground for denying recovery was still open.
Appellant was not freed from the ordinary requirements for the recovery of damages for breach of contract. She had to establish that
1) at sometime during the performance of the contract, she discovered
the facts that rendered it illegal; 2) she ceased her performance because of this illegality; 3) she had until that time performed the contract in good faith and 4) was ready, able and willing, but for the
illegality, to continue to perform. 9
Appellant based her refusal to continue performance not upon
the illegality, but rather upon the claim that the other party had not
performed. Nor after the illegality was brought to light did she amend
9 98 Cal. App. 2d 829, 221 P.2d 252
7
1 CAL. Bus. & POF.CODE § 7031.
98
99

BrTATEmENT, CoNmAcrs
REsTATEmENT,

ComrAcTs

(1950).

§ 599(b), at 1111 (1932).
§ 329, at 503 and § 599(b), at 1112 (1932).
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her pleadings to set forth the illegality or any exception in her favor
to the general rule of no relief. The trial court's judgment denying any
relief to appellant was affirmed.
Illegal Purposes, Methods of Performance
If a contract, though otherwise legal in every respect is entered
for an unlawful purpose, it is void. In Severance v. Knight-Counihan'00
for example, an executory contract, the immediate object of which was
lawful, but which was entered for the purpose of defrauding creditors,
was held invalid.
Nevertheless, if an agreement which does not provide for a method
of accomplishing its purpose can be accomplished by any legal method,
it must be assumed that such method was contemplated when the contract was made and will be pursued, and it will not be presumed that
the parties intended to perform in an illegal manner.' 0 '
In West Covina Enterprises, Inc., v. Chalmers,'0 2 the trial court
had awarded plaintiff damages for the breach of a contract by an architect who had agreed to draw up plans and specifications for a hospital.
Defendant was not licensed as an architect in California, but recited
this fact in the contract itself. Plaintiff asserted that neither the contract nor the performance had been illegal, since the statute provided:
".... [An unlicensed person may render architectural services if, prior
to performing any services, he informs the client in writing that he is
not a licensed architect."' 0 3 The court, however, relied on the section
of the Administrative Code which requires that plans and specifications
for a hospital be prepared by a licensed architect or a registered civil
04
engineer.
In reversing the award of damages, the supreme court held that
a presumption regarding legality of performance would arise only
when a contract does not provide for an illegal mode of performance.
It was determined that the contract in this case called for a performance which would be a violation of a statute. Defendant could not
have lawfully performed without a license and was therefore justified
in repudiating the contract when he subsequently learned of the requirements of the Administrative Code.
Du Pre v. Bogumill'0 5 illustrates an extension of the presumption.
100 29 Cal. 2d 561, 177 P.2d 4 (1947). See also Shephard v. Lerner, 182 Cal. App.
6 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960).
10 Freeman v. Jergins, 125 Cal. App. 2d 536, 546, 271 P.2d 210 (1954). See also
12 CAL. JUR. (SECOND) Contracts § 69 at 272 (1953).
102 49 Cal. 2d 754, 322 P.2d 13 (1958).
103 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5537.
104 17 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 406.
105 173 Cal. App. 2d 406, 343 P.2d 415 (1959).
2d -,
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Plaintiff was seeking to recover the price under a contract for the sale
of a restaurant and liquor license. A section of the Administrative
Code provideso6 inter aliathat the transferor shall not permit the transferee to exercise any of the privileges of a license until it is transferred,
and that transfer of the title shall coincide with the transfer of the
license. Plaintiff had transferred possession of the property to the
defendant, who operated the business without a license and raised
the illegality of the contract as a defense to plaintiff's action.
The court held that since the contract, which did not itself provide
for an illegal performance, could have been performed in a legal manner, the presumption that the parties intended to perform the contract
in such a legal manner was applicable. The contract could have been
legally performed if the defendant had applied for a transfer of the
license and had operated the business during pendency of his application, pursuant to a written agreement as the plaintiff's agent, with
the approval of the licensing division. The Administrative Code section further provided that the transferor was required to join in the
application for the transfer. Although no application was made, the
court, citing from California Jurisprudence, Second, continued: "'Moreover, where the contract can be performed in a legal manner as well
as in an illegal manner, it will not be declared void because it was in
fact performed in an illegal manner.""107
The court made no mention of the qualification placed on the extension of the presumption by California Jurisprudence, Second:1 08
This last principle is applied, however, only where the contract
itself manifests no intent or purpose that it is to be performed in
an illegal manner and where the party seeking to enforce its terms
does not participate in or cooperate with the illegal performance.
The court did say that there was every indication that plaintiff
had not the slightest idea that he was the party to the breaking of
any law, rule or regulation. The facts revealed that plaintiff had relied
on the representations of the defendant's attorney that the "contract
and the proceeding were proper." Plaintiff was aided by the exception to the rule of nonenforcement in favor of ". . a party who was
not acquainted with minor statutory or executive regulations relating
to a particular business and who was justified in presuming special
knowledge by the other party of such regulation." 10 9
106 4 CAL. Anlmm.

CODE § 60(d).
(SEcoND) Contracts §

69, at 272 (1953), cited in Du Pre v. Bogunill, supra note 105, at 413, 243 P.2d at 420.
108 12 CAL. Jun. (SEcoND) Contracts § 69, at 272 (1953).
100
RESTATEmmT, CoNmiAcrs § 599(b), at 1111 (1932).
107

12 CAL. Junt.
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It is evident that the presumption of intent to perform the contract in a legal manner is dependent on the degree of relative fault
between the parties. It is only available to a party seeking to enforce
its terms who did not participate in or cooperate with the illegal performance. The presumption in turn will allow the remedies usually
associated with an action upon a legal contract. It is another demonstration of determining the relief available by the degree of relative
fault, by such rules as pari delicto or justifiable ignorance. The public
interest must have been considered, if at all, in the formulation of
such rules. The result is that the weight of public interest becomes
"frozen" in them. While different rules may be available for varying
degrees of relative fault, the notion of public interest will be preconceived in each of them. The degree of relative fault in each case may,
by determining the applicable rule, ultimately determine the relief
available.
Separate Treatment of Public Interest Factor
Consideration of the public interest, only at the stage of the formulation of the rule, overlooks the reality that the extent to which the
public interest is involved will vary in each case just as the degree of
relative fault between the parties. Other courts have weighed the
public interest separately in each case to determine what remedies
would be available in any event, and then granted the remedy from
among these, if any, which would be appropriate to do justice between
the parties. This seems to be the approach in the "accounting of proceeds" cases, 110 which often extend greater relief than would be available under the fixed rules of relative fault.
It will be recalled that in Holt v. Morgan,"" the refusal of the
court to enforce an agreement in violation of a statute was based
solely on the degree of protection which the court determined the legislature intended for the public interest. Rather than making this policy the measure of pari delicto, the court simply held that the rule was
inapplicable where the policy precluded enforcement of the transaction, whatever the degree of relative fault between the parties.
The distinct and primary emphasis upon public interest involved
in the particularcase is also evident in the recent decision in Black
Point Aggregates, Inc. v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co.1 1 2 The plaintiff
had obtained a permit to issue stock, conditioned upon escrow of the
share certificates. No transfer by the stockholders could be made with110 Epstein v. Stahl, 176 Cal. App. 2d 53, 1 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1959); Norwood v. Judd,
93 Cal. App. 2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949).
1:1 128 Cal. App. 2d 113, 274 P.2d 915 (1954).
"12 188 Cal. App. 2d -- , 10 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1961).
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out the written consent of the Commissioner. Plaintiff corporation,
in financial difficulties, entered certain agreements during this time
with the defendant whereby the property of the former was leased in
return for "rentals" to be paid by defendant. Plaintiff also agreed to
deposit in escrow stock certificates representing at least 80 per cent
of its outstanding capital stock, such certificates to be "duly endorsed
in blank by the owners thereof." The shareholders were to receive
from the "rentals" and certain "royalties," a total sum representing
120 per cent of the par value of the outstanding shares. Plaintiff sought
to determine the legality of these agreements. The court held that
they clearly contemplated a stock transfer in violation of the Corporate
Securities Act. 113 Although, as between the parties, it appeared defendants had dictated the terms to the plaintiff corporation which was
in financial straits, and to permit them to assert the invalidity of the
agreements would, in a sense, permit them to rely on their own wrong
as a defense, enforcement nonetheless would be denied. The court
said: "However, questions of public policy far beyond the equities of
the immediate parties are involved. To enforce the agreements here
involved 'would be to open the door to all the illegal practices con'1 4
demned by the Corporate Securities Act." .

Conclusion
Corbin points out that the factors in this area"... occur in numberless combinations, making easy generalizations unsafe, however frequently they may be repeated. The specific combination found in each
case must be weighed in the light of prevailing mores and judicial
experience." 115
In general terms, the factors can be grouped as follows:
* TEE REm-ms: Remedies of specific performance and compensatory damages constitute enforcement of the contract. Specific restoration or payment of the reasonable value of consideration given
are not regarded as enforcement, although any relief must be predicated upon proof of the contract, and its breach." 6 Enforcement is
usually limited to the executed features of the contract. Remedies of
specific performance or damages for anticipatory breach are rare.
* THE DEGREs OF FAULT: The cases have considered the following
degrees of relative fault:
1) The party seeking relief is in equal or greater legal fault with
113 CAL. CORP. CODE
114

Supra note 112, at

125

6 ComnmN,

116

Id. § 1535, at 1060.

§§ 25000-26103.
-,

10 Cal. Rptr. at 765 (1961).

op. cit. supra note 1, § 1534, at 1057-58.
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respect to the factors which make the contract illegal. (In pari de-

licto.)
2) Although both parties are blameworthy, the fault of one is only
slight compared to that of the other. (Not in pari delicto.)
3) The party seeking to enforce the contract did not participate
in or cooperate with the other's unlawful performance and the contract itself manifests no intent or purpose that it is to be performed
in an illegal manner. (Presumption of intent to perform in a legal
manner, and the contract will not be declared void even if it was in
fact performed in an illegal manner.)
4) One party is justifiably ignorant, and the other party is not,
of facts or minor regulations relating to a particular business which
make the bargain illegal. (Justifiable ignorance.)

TiE PUBLic INTEEST: The degree to which the interest of the
public must be protected, unless fixed expressly by statute or by the
original formulation of a rule of relative fault, will vary in degree with
the circumstances in each case.
It should, in the final analysis, be the measure of the relief available, if any, between parties who stand in various degrees of relative
fault between themselves.

